1. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) 5. Id. at 48. (commenting, while mulling over his concern, that the Oregon court's persistence in sustaining the punitive damage award given in the earlier Williams II decision may send a signal encouraging disobedience by other lower courts).
6. In Williams I, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and remanded the case back to the Oregon courts to consider the possible effects of Campbell, which was decided after the Oregon Court of Appeals had reached its final decision. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (Williams I) , 540 U.S. 801 (2003) (mem.). In Williams II, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a challenged jury instruction that was approved by the Oregon Supreme Court. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (Williams II) , 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007) . The jury instruction at issue appeared to Justice Breyer, writing for a five-to-four majority, to cross the due process line first drawn by the Court in Gore. Id . at 352 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 547). The Gore decision considered actual and potential harm caused by the defendant's wrongful acts to persons other than the plaintiff. Id. at 353. consideration in Williams III was the Oregon Supreme Court's handling of the remand in Williams II-to correct the constitutionality of a jury instruction regarding the calculation of a punitive damages award. 7 In its decision on remand, the Oregon Supreme Court did not implement Justice Stephen Breyer's seemingly clear directions. 8 Instead of correcting the constitutional error identified, the Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed the original punitive damages judgment against Philip Morris on a procedural ground not previously considered during the appellate review of the case. 9 Commenting to the Court about this surprising development during the December 2008 oral arguments, Stephen Shapiro, Philip Morris's attorney, asserted:
We are here today because the Oregon court failed to follow this Court's direction on remand and because the ground it gave is not adequate to show a forfeiture of due process rights . . . . This Court vacated [Williams II] after finding that the Oregon Supreme Court applied the wrong constitutional standard, and it remanded with directions to apply the standard that the Court laid out. But the Oregon court didn't do that. It never even addressed the constitutional issue. 10 Four months later, in a curious and unexplained move, the Court summarily dismissed Williams III without taking further action, stating only that "certiorari [had been] improvidently granted." 11 This was not the first time in recent years that the Supreme Court faced resistance or reluctance by a state supreme court on a remand to fully implement the Court's directions to correct punitive damages awards that were determined to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or excessive. This resistance is 7. Williams II, 549 U.S. at 350-51. As read by Justice Breyer and the majority, the questionable instruction in Williams II could be reasonably interpreted by a jury to allow the jury to consider actual and potential harm caused by the defendant's wrongful acts to persons other than the plaintiff when calculating the size of the punitive damages award necessary to fully punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing. Id. at 354. Justice Breyer stated that he thought the Court had clearly ruled in Gore that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits a state from imposing punishment for harm inflicted upon strangers to the litigation, thereby rendering constitutionally defective the jury instruction that appeared to permit such punishment. Id 9. Id. The Oregon court ruled that the jury instruction requested by Philip Morris at the original trial so badly misstated Oregon law that, under well-settled Oregon precedent, Philip Morris was barred from appealing the plaintiff's instruction that was actually given to the jury and which formed the basis for the Supreme Court review sought by Philip Morris in Williams II. Id 13 two leading cases on punitive damages decided before Williams II. In these two cases, the Court most fully developed the framework for applying the "fair notice" principle, embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, to review punitive damages awards.
14 Of the nine punitive damages cases the Court has decided in the past twenty-five years, only Gore and Campbell were vacated because the Supreme Court found the state courts' decisions in violation of evolving substantive due process jurisprudence as applied directly to the size of punitive damages awards. 15 In both cases, on remand, the state supreme courts only partially complied with the Court's orders and also failed to fully apply the Court's suggested analysis. 16 In Gore, on remand, the Alabama Supreme Court ignored the suggestion that punitive damages awards over four times the compensatory damages were excessive. 17 Although the Alabama Supreme Court did reduce the punitive damages award, it did so to a figure twelve and one-half times the compensatory award. 18 The defendant, BMW, did not seek further judicial review of the reduced award. 19 12. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1997). Gore was the first case in which the Court applied its substantive due process analysis to hold a state punitive damage award excessive ($4 million punitive damages for $4000 compensatory damages). BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 509 (1996) . On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced its original punitive damages award from $4 million to $50,000. Gore, 701 So. 2d at 515. By setting the corrected punitive award at over twelve times the compensatory damages, however, the Alabama Supreme Court failed to follow the Supreme Court's recommendation that punitive damages should not exceed a single digit ratio in relation to the compensatory damages, with a preference for four-to-one ratios. Gore, 517 U.S. at 581. No further review of the Alabama decision was sought by the defendant. Id.
13. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004). In Campbell, the Court remanded to the Utah Supreme Court a $145 million punitive damages award it determined to be flawed on several counts, and almost certainly unconstitutionally excessive. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003) . On remand, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed each of the issues identified in the Supreme Court's opinion as problematic and reaffirmed its earlier decision with respect to the correctness of its rulings under Utah law. Campbell, 98 P.3d at 412. The Utah court reduced the size of the punitive damages award from $145 million to just over $9 million. Id. at 410. This adjusted punitive award was still nine times the compensatory damages awarded in the case, notwithstanding the view expressed by the Supreme Court that any punitive damages award larger than a one-to-one ratio might be excessive on the facts of the case. Id In Campbell, Justice Anthony Kennedy rejected a punitive damages award of $145 million as grossly excessive, stating that the proper punitive damages award should be near the $1 million in compensatory damages awarded-a one-to-one ratio. 20 On remand, the Utah Supreme Court rejected State Farm's argument that the Supreme Court "mandate[ed]" a punitive damages award no higher than the compensatory damages and only reduced the award to $9 million. 21 This award had a nine-to-one ratio between the punitive and compensatory damages and thus was the greatest possible ratio within the Court's preferred single-digit ratio framework.
22
The Supreme Court denied certiorari when State Farm sought further review.
23
This history provides a context for the concern that the lower courts might be misapplying or failing to apply Supreme Court precedent governing punitive damages. This concern was highlighted during the Williams III oral argument, when Chief Justice John Roberts suggested that, if there was something "malodorous" about how Oregon handled the remand in Williams II, perhaps articulating a clear standard regarding the proper ratio might help ease this concern and "protect [the Court's] constitutional authority" in excessive punitive damages claims. 24 The 568-70 (1996) . In Gore and Campbell, the Court promulgated the three guideposts for lower courts to apply in reviewing potentially excessive punitive damages awards and to justify punitive damages: (1) the defendant's conduct must be "reprehensible;" (2) the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages must be reasonable; and (3) where relevant, the civil fine or criminal penalty for comparable conduct should be used as a benchmark. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418; Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75. The second guidepost concerning the ratio between compensatory damages and punitive damages has received the most attention by the Court. (2008) . In Exxon, although due process jurisprudence was discussed favorably, it was not entirely useful in determining the acceptable size of the punitive damages award, which was reduced from $2 billion to $500 million-achieving a one-to-one ratio. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 481, 513-15 (2008).
excessive award and its reluctance to apply its new due process jurisprudence. 29 Compounding the puzzle was the Court's summary dismissal of Williams III several months after oral arguments, stating that certiorari had been "improvidently granted" as the only explanation. 30 One potential explanation for the summary dismissal is that the Supreme Court recognized that, rather than exhibiting an unwillingness to follow precedent, the Oregon court was merely exercising its authority in supervising its own procedural domain and would provide a proper jury instruction henceforth. Later Oregon cases are consistent with this explanation and appear to demonstrate subsequent compliance with Supreme Court precedent.
31
If this "no harm, no foul" explanation is correct, once the Court decided not to send the jury instruction back to the Oregon court again, why did it not extend its original grant of certiorari to include the excessiveness issue? Perhaps the Justices preferred waiting for a case with less egregious facts to fine-tune Guidepost 2.
Another possible explanation of the summary dismissal advanced by one scholar is that it signaled the Supreme Court's retreat from its close oversight of state punitive damages awards. 32 Initially, some U.S. jurisdictions did not recognize claims for punitive damages when first encountered, but in the 1854 case of Day v. Woodworth, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a plaintiff's entitlement to a jury award for punitive damages to punish unusually aggravated wrongdoing by a defendant was "well established" in American common law.
39
Throughout the next century, most U.S. courts allowed juries wide discretion in determining whether punitive damages were justified and in fixing the amount of the punitive damages award necessary to punish the defendant and deter future bad conduct. During this period, judicial review of jury awards of punitive damages was highly deferential. Awards were set aside only if they were clearly the product of "prejudice, passion, or bias" on the part of the jury, or if the award "lacked evidentiary support or . . . shocked the . . . conscience" of the reviewing court. 40 38. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 522 (4th ed. 1868) (demonstrating that English cases in the eighteenth century that awarded private plaintiffs money beyond what they could prove as compensatory damages denoted these extra damages as "exemplary"). These early cases often involved private actions against governmental actors who had exceeded their authority. See J. G. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES 758 (1883). As the recognition of the possible availability of punitive damages migrated to America, the typical early case involved a different type of abuse of power, namely outrageous social or economic conduct deliberately intended to harm and humiliate the plaintiff. Id. at 726. A few state courts refused to recognize the availability of a claim for exemplary damages, the legitimacy of which was subject to vigorous debate among tort scholars. This began to change in the latter half of the twentieth century. Beginning in the 1960s, a few lower federal court opinions expressed serious concerns about the undisciplined nature and exploding size of punitive damages awards. 41 In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court, while continuing to rule that punitive damages awards generally were not subject to constitutional scrutiny by federal courts, nevertheless held that punitive damages' unpredictability rendered them inappropriate in cases in which First Amendment rights were at issue, 42 and in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against city officials. 43 In a seminal 1982 article, 44 Professor Dorsey Ellis observed that the incidence of large punitive damages awards was rising rapidly and questioned whether such awards were the best way for society to regulate egregious misbehavior by tortfeasors. 45 Because of the escalating rate of punitive damages awards, Ellis also raised doubts that would-be tortfeasors were afforded fair notice of the severe consequences of losing a lawsuit alleging their misbehavior. 46 Later in the 1980s, several legal scholars began building arguments to constrain or eliminate punitive damages as a remedy.
47

A. Early Supreme Court Discourse: Addressing State Courts' Punitive Damages Awards Practice
The first hint that the Supreme Court might be open to considering constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards appeared in a 1986 decision in which the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was used to challenge an Alabama Supreme Court Justice's refusal to recuse himself when he stood to obtain a financial gain depending on the outcome of the case. 45. Id. at 2, 53. 46. Ellis focused his concern on two different issues. First, he challenged the economic efficiency of private law enforcement through punitive damages. Id. at 31. Second, he raised a fairness issue: given the extreme unpredictability of punitive damages awards, can wrongdoers be fairly said to be on notice about the possible drastic financial consequences of their harmful actions? Id. at 22. On this latter point, Ellis anticipated, by almost a decade, the start of the Supreme Court giving attention to the "fair notice" element of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and its procedural and substantive implications regarding the need to rein in punitive damages awards challenged as arbitrary or excessive. constitutional challenges to the amount of punitive damages awarded in addition to the recusal for bias claim. 49 The Court declined to address both the defendant's Eighth Amendment excessive fine claim and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim; however, Chief Justice Warren Berger expressly stated that both raised "important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved." 50 It did not take long for the appropriate setting to arise. Although several justices played key roles over the next two decades in expanding the scope of the Due Process Clause to encompass problematic punitive damages awards, Justice O'Connor was the most relentless champion of the enterprise. 51 When Justice O'Connor retired from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2005, she left a lasting mark on constitutional law in several important fields. In describing her legacy, however, few scholars highlighted her successful campaign to subject punitive damages awards to searching constitutional scrutiny, both procedurally and substantively. Thanks to Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court ultimately developed a new and controversial set of constitutional standards applying the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to evaluate possible unreasonableness or excessiveness of punitive damages awards. . Justice O'Connor argued unsuccessfully that the "excessive fines" provision of the Eighth Amendment should operate through the Fourteenth Amendment to impose a substantive ceiling on state punitive damages awards. Id. at 300. Justice O'Connor also renewed her call for applying procedural due process to the seemingly unregulated discretion granted to juries under the traditional common law process for determining both the appropriateness and size of punitive damages awards. Id. at 283. She justified her position by asserting that inherent in the concept of due process was the proposition that defendants were entitled to fair notice with respect to the probable consequences of their wrongdoing, and that because punitive damages were a form of civil penalty, the idea that the punishment should fit the wrong was applicable. Id. at 297. In discussing these issues, Justice O'Connor foreshadowed, by seven years, the eventual adoption by the Court of formal constitutional guideposts to assist lower courts in their review of jury awards of punitive damages. Id. at 300-01.
52. Justice O'Connor's ideas about due process imposing outside limits on punitive damages were first officially embraced by the Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). The majority opinion expressly endorsed the application of both procedural and substantive due process to jury awards of punitive damages, but nevertheless found that the traditional common law process used in Alabama met procedural due process standards because it was subjected to careful review by both the trial judge and the appellate In the view of some constitutional scholars, the Court completely "federalized" the common law governing punitive damages in a series of decisions in which it invoked the principle of "fair notice," found embedded in the Due Process Clause. 53 Applying procedural due process principles, the Court first required all states to provide meaningful opportunities for rigorous judicial review of punitive damages. 54 The Court later extended this reasoning by requiring de novo review of the reasonableness of punitive damages awards. 55 In a 2007 ruling, oddly characterized as procedural, the Court required that jury instructions confine the jury's deliberations to the plaintiff alone and not to strangers to the litigation when considering the appropriate punitive damages size. 56 This new application of procedural due process principles to punitive damages is uncontroversial, except for several opponents who claim that it intrudes too greatly into the legitimate interests of the states to shape their laws and processes. 57 Justice O'Connor's campaign to impose both procedural and substantive constitutional limits on punitive damages continued in her dissent two years later in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 58 court. Id. at 19-24. The majority also found that the punitive damages award, which was over four times the compensatory damages award, was not unconstitutionally excessive. Id. at 23. Justice O'Connor's dissent was lengthy and strongly worded. Id. at 42-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (remarking that the award was "close to the line" but did not lack objective criteria). O'Connor noted that excessive punitive damages awards "have a devastating potential for harm." Id. at 42. She characterized the traditional common law deference to jury decision-making as so unprincipled as to be unconstitutionally "void for vagueness." Id. at 43. Justice O'Connor also renewed her insistence that the Court should set forth constitutional "guideposts" to assist lower courts in their decision-making regarding whether to award punitive damages and the appropriate size of awards. 58. 509 U.S. 443, 480 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The TXO majority agreed that due process standards based on fair notice applied to both the process by which punitive damages were awarded and the size of the award made. Id. at 458 (majority opinion). The plurality opinion, however, found that the traditional jury process was satisfactory under procedural due process norms and also held that the award, which was 526 times the size of the compensatory award, was not unconstitutionally excessive because the defendant's wrong raised the potential for great harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 460-62. Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's principle, she condemned the traditional common law deference to the jury as standardless and argued that the award at issue was grossly excessive because there was no evidence in the record supporting the potential harm analysis. Id. at 484-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
One year later, in Honda Motor Co. LTD. v. Oberg, the Supreme Court finally applied the procedural due process analysis long advocated by Justice O'Connor to strike down an Oregon [Vol. 62:371
B. The Three Guideposts: Due Process and Punitive Damages
Despite repeated dissents, the Supreme Court ultimately extended the due process principle of fair notice to the size of punitive damages awards. 59 This extension of substantive due process is based on the argument that even the most egregious tortfeasors should not be unfairly surprised by the size of punitive damages awards. 60 Since 1996, the Court has utilized this fair notice analysis with respect to both deservedness and the possible excessiveness of awards.
61
To guide lower courts in implementing the newly imposed constitutional responsibility to review punitive damages awards, the Court established three guideposts in Gore 62 and further refined them in Campbell.
63
Justice Kennedy recited the three guideposts as follows: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) In 1996, the Court struck down an Alabama court's award of punitive damages on the grounds that the size of the award was unconstitutionally excessive as a matter of substantive due process. Id. at 585-86. In Gore, the punitive damages award to the plaintiff was 500 times the compensatory damages, but the defendant's misconduct was far from egregious and inflicted only minor economic harm. Id. at 574-75. The Supreme Court also found fault with the Alabama trial process, which allowed the jury to consider the defendant's legal business practices in other states with alleged out-of-state victims who were not parties to the litigation in Alabama. Id. at 572-73; see also Williams II, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007) (holding a similar procedural fault as the basis of remand to the Oregon courts after the jury appeared to consider harm done to non-plaintiff parties in determining the size of the appropriate punitive damages award). Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion in Gore and also Justice Breyer's concurrence, arguing that the Alabama jury process was subject to other more serious deficiencies overlooked by the majority. Gore, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he standards the Alabama courts applied here are vague and open ended to the point where they risk arbitrary results"). For the first time, the Court accepted Justice O'Connor's plea to provide greater instruction to lower courts by adopting three guideposts for reviewing punitive damages decisions challenged as unconstitutionally unreasonable or excessive. Id. at 574-75. The guideposts, however, were not concrete rules to be strictly applied, but were rather general principles for the lower courts to adapt to the facts of individual cases. Id. at 585-86. Dissenters on the Court and tort scholars scoffed at the guideposts as an unprincipled incursion into the legitimate realm of state decision-making that lower courts would find very difficult to implement. See, e.g., id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "'guideposts' mark a road to nowhere" and provide no real guidance).
61 or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." 64 The guideposts aim to assure, through "[e]xacting appellate review [,] . . . that an award of punitive damages is based upon an 'application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice.'" 65 Williams II did not involve interpretation or application of the guideposts. 66 The holding was narrow and explicitly deemed procedural by Justice Breyer, thus reinforcing the principle that a jury may not constitutionally take into account harm to strangers to the litigation when calculating punitive damages awards. 67 This holding drew a fine line, however, because the Supreme Court concedes that the defendant's misconduct, which harms others within the state, may be taken into account by the jury when considering awarding punitive damages based on the defendant's degree of reprehensibility.
68
C. Punitive Damages and the Unconstitutionally Excessive Standard
The court's decision in Exxon regarding excessive punitive damages is difficult to reconcile with the rest of its due process analysis. 69 Exercising original jurisdiction over admiralty law cases, the Supreme Court surprised tort lawyers and scholars by upholding the Ninth Circuit's four-to-four decision to allow punitive damages. The six-to-three decision, in which Justice O'Connor joined the majority, vacated the Utah court's decision and remanded it for reconsideration, but stated that the case was easy to decide in favor of the defendant by applying the guideposts because the punitive damages award was so grossly excessive. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429. Thus, the decision did not provide an extended analysis of how the guideposts clarified that the Utah court's decision was unconstitutional. The majority opinion minimally expanded the reprehensibility factor, the ratio norms, and how substantial variance from these norms would appear. Id. at 419-28. The Court also said little about the comparability to sanctions for similar offenses, other than observing that criminal punishments were of limited relevance. Id. at 428. As elaborated in the Campbell opinion, the three guideposts set forth in Gore are intended to be operative tests for constitutional review of punitive damages awards challenged as arbitrary or excessive. lowering-the original award by eighty percent. 71 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, approvingly described the evolution of the Court's due process tests, emphasizing the second guidepost-ratio-but declining to apply such analysis in Exxon.
72
Justice Souter instead chose to develop new federal admiralty standards limiting the size of punitive damages when large compensatory damages have already been awarded. 73 In applying these new principles to Exxon, Justice Souter lowered the punitive damages award to a one-to-one ratio, suggesting that this should be the norm in all cases with very large compensatory damage awards.
74
Justice O'Connor's drive for increasingly aggressive Supreme Court review of state punitive damages awards has never commanded decisive majorities in cases in which her views prevailed; 75 the Court is almost always closely divided on these issues. 76 Justice Scalia has strenuously resisted using the Due Process Clause to prescribe the size of state court punitive damages awards since first broaching the issue in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.
77
Justice Clarence Thomas later joined Justice Scalia in his position.
78 Their repeated objections rest on the ground that elected legislatures, not the judiciary, should establish new due process protections.
79
The historical argument is that the common law processes for jury determination of punitive damages were already well established before the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in 1868. 80 84. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reiterating that an award of punitive damages at the "discretion of the jury, subject to some judicial review for 'reasonableness,'" in state court is sufficient due process because "there is no federal guarantee a damages award actually be reasonable").
85. 89. Ellis, supra note 44, at 3. Professor Ellis enumerated the seven grounds as the following: "(1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; (3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the plaintiff's attorneys' fees." Id.
90. Id. at 11.
among tort scholars as the "bedbug case," 91 set forth a broader "law and economics" rationale for imposing punitive damages. 92 Posner suggested that punitive damages may be necessary to provide a needed incentive to litigate when the harm done to multiple plaintiffs is too difficult to detect, too widely distributed, or compensatory damages are likely to be too small to justify any single plaintiff bringing an action. 93 Judge Posner suggested that punitive damages awards may also help to prevent wealthy and determined tortfeasors from profiting from their ability to escape detection. 94 The Supreme Court has not accepted any of these alternative rationales for punitive damages; instead, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the state's interests in punishment and deterrence as the operative justifications. death of the eleven workers killed or for the environmental and economic harm caused by the devastating pollution of the Gulf.
98
A. The First Guidepost: Reprehensibility of the Wrong
Assuming the allegations are true and provable that BP, or other oil industry defendants with whom BP has "hold harmless" contracts, knowingly took unreasonable risks that endangered personnel on the drilling platform and caused the disastrous pollution of the Gulf, 99 the first determination to be made with respect to punitive damages under the framework established in Gore would be the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. 100 The Gore Court explained the reprehensibility factor as reflecting the well-settled notion "that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others." 101 The Court has stated that the degree of reprehensibility is "[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award." 102 Gore enumerated several factors for lower courts to consider in determining the degree of reprehensibility present in a particular case; 103 the Court later clarified these factors in Campbell.
104 The five factors, as enumerated in Campbell, are: (1) whether the conduct caused physical harm versus purely economic harm; (2) "indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;" (3) the financial vulnerability of the plaintiff; (4) repeated instance of similar misconduct versus an isolated incident; and (5) whether "the harm result[ed] from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit" as opposed to a merely accidental happening. 105 All five factors are rarely present in a single case, so the reviewing court must apply the factors that are relevant to the specific facts. Although the presence of multiple reprehensibility factors makes sustaining the punitive damages award easier, one dominant factor can be sufficient to sustain an award. In Campbell, however, Justice Kennedy opined that "the absence of all of [ It is possible that the Deepwater Horizon incident could give rise to the rare case in which all five factors would apply. 107 First, the oil companies' conduct inflicted enormous physical harm through death and injury to humans and wildlife, likely causing long-term harm to regional ecosystems; 108 their conduct also caused monumental economic harm to the Gulf region. 109 Second, defendants' alleged relentless focus on speed and cost savings manifested an indifference to the safety of their workers, the environment, and the Gulf's regional economy. 110 Third, the fishing, seafood, and tourist industries in the Gulf region are particularly vulnerable to oil pollution. Fourth, BP's safety record regarding its oil drilling, oil transport, and oil refining activities is checkered at best. 111 Their record arguably reflects a pattern of placing profits above worker safety and environmental protection.
112
The Deepwater Horizon catastrophe was not an isolated incident. 113 As to the fifth factor, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove deliberate deceit or outright malice in the planning and mismanagement of the Deepwater Horizon.
114
Gross disregard for worker safety and severe damage to the environment because of reckless haste, however, are certainly in the same class of egregious conduct as the rapacious corporate practices condemned by the Court in TXO. 115 Taken together, there is a strong case for the proposition that this catastrophe was not merely an innocent accident.
B. The Second Guidepost: Ratio of Punitive Damages to Compensatory Damages
The Deepwater Horizon disaster also warrants application of the second Gore guidepost-the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.
116
The numerical relationship between the amount of compensatory damages and punitive damages is a significant consideration and is the most commonly cited basis for determining the excessiveness of a punitive damages award. 117 The requirement of a reasonable relationship between punitive and compensatory damages was constitutionalized in Gore, 118 but the exact definition of what is "reasonable" remains unsettled. 119 The Court in Gore recognized the common law preference for single-digit ratios 120 but refused to adopt a mathematical formula or other bright-line rule. 121 The Court observed that consideration of the ratio is fact-specific; although a larger disparity between punitive and compensatory damages is subject to close scrutiny, the Court also recognized the possibility that certain factual situations could warrant higher punitive awards. 122 The Court reaffirmed the fact-specific determination necessary to calculate the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in Campbell.
123 Other pre-Gore decisions by the Court have stressed that the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff is not the sole factor in determining the acceptable ratio. 124 Several decisions have considered the relevance of other indices of reasonableness, including the extent of the potential harm that could have resulted. 125 For example, had the Deepwater Horizon oil spill continued into hurricane season, the impact of a Category four or five hurricane, combined with millions of gallons of oil still pouring out of the uncapped well, could have resulted in a much higher amount of harm. (2007) (finding that it is "appropriate to consider the reasonableness of punitive damages awards in light of the potential harm the defendant's conduct could have caused"); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424-25 (referencing both actual and potential harm in considering limits on the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages); TXO, 509 U.S. at 460 (holding that "[i]t is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to the other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred").
The amount of compensatory damages recovered by the plaintiffs injured by the Deepwater Horizon incident will undoubtedly be very high.
126
In December 2012, BP pled guilty to federal criminal charges, including manslaughter, and agreed to pay $4.5 billion in fines. 127 As of February 2013, BP had paid out $24 billion in clean-up costs and payments to damaged individuals, businesses, and local governments, reportedly setting aside an additional $42 billion to cover future legal obligations relating to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 128 The anticipation of a large compensatory damages award could result in the equal expectation, according to the Court's decision in Campbell, of a limited punitive damages award. 129 Indeed, punitive damages could be limited to the amount of the compensatory damages award, reflecting the one-to-one ratio established in Exxon. 130 Conversely, the Deepwater Horizon disaster could be the paradigm of the extraordinary case that warrants higher punitive damages because of particularly egregious harm. 131 Similarly, even in the event of high compensatory damages, the deterrent effect of punitive damages could justify a more disparate ratio, especially if the history of the defendant's oil exploration activities reveals similar reckless conduct. 132 The combination of a pattern of safety infractions and the wealth of a defendant like BP could impact the applicability and effect 131. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (holding that the extent of harm caused to the plaintiff, whether actual or potential, warrants a higher ratio). The idea of particularly egregious harm warranting a higher punitive damages award is reminiscent of the first Gore guidepost. See id. at 575 (finding that "some wrongs are more blameworthy than others").
132. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (explaining that punishment and deterrence are part of the underlying rationale of punitive damages); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (recognizing the importance of imposing a proper punitive damages award in order to deter misconduct).
of deterrence in contemplating a larger punitive damages award. 133 In weighing the guideposts, a court could reasonably approve a high damages ratio for the purpose of warning BP, and the entire oil industry, that higher standards of safety and environmental protection are expected in the future.
C. The Third Guidepost: Comparability to Civil Sanctions
The third guidepost determines excessiveness of the punitive damages by contemplating the penalties of analogous civil actions or criminal violations.
134
It emphasizes the reasonableness of a punitive damages award when it is comparable to similar unlawful misconduct. 135 Although this rationale was applicable in Gore, in which there was a sizeable disparity between the $10,000 statutory fine and the original $4 million in punitive damages awarded by the jury, 136 subsequent cases have demonstrated that large differences between punitive awards and civil fines are not unusual. 137 The state's interest in punishing or deterring misconduct is not necessarily related to the policies underlying statutory penalties. 138 In practice, it is often difficult to identify and interpret germane civil or criminal sanctions; increasingly, courts look to inter-and intra-jurisdictional precedent for comparability guidance. The relative lack of utility of the third guidepost is reflected in the fact that comparable penalties are generally considered only after the application of the first two guideposts. 140 Rather than simply drawing analogies between degree of misconduct and similar sanctions, cases applying the third guidepost struggle to interpret and apply penalties such as the disgorgement of profits, loss of a relevant business license, or possible incarceration. 141 In Campbell, Justice Kennedy questioned the relevance of criminal sanctions, recognizing the challenge of applying the different presumptions and higher burdens of proof in criminal matters.
142
If the third guidepost carried more weight, uncertainty about which civil or criminal sanctions should be used as comparisons might be of more concern; however, in many cases, the third guidepost appears to offer little or no meaningful direction to lower courts.
Although the third guidepost is the least useful to reviewing courts in evaluating claims of excessiveness, it may justify higher punitive damages awards in the Deepwater Horizon calamity. The federal criminal penalty for oil pollution is a steep fine ranging from $25,000 to $100,000 per day, 143 plus full responsibility for all of the costs of cleaning up the spill. 144 In this case, BP has already settled for $4.5 billion in federal criminal penalties. 145 Other civil fines and costs are estimated to total tens of billions of dollars. 146 It may also be relevant that the Obama Administration reached an agreement with BP under which the corporation established a $20 billion fund, administered by former 9/11 fund administrator Ken Feinberg, to compensate firms and individuals in the Gulf area who suffered damages from the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 147 Therefore, because of the well-established practice that the third guidepost does not override liability under the other two guideposts, but serves primarily as an independent benchmark for courts to consider in evaluating the award, the prospect of potentially high civil and criminal penalties appears to support a large punitive damages award, better suited to the Deepwater Horizon incident than to run-of-the-mill industrial mishaps. Also pointing toward large punitive damages is the tendency of courts to look to intra-and inter-jurisdictional precedent to determine the excessiveness of a particular punitive damages award. 148 For example, Exxon, where the oil company paid roughly $1.3 billion in civil and criminal penalties, 149 also supports a very high punitive damages award.
III. "MARCHING ORDERS" VERSUS AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE DISCRETION: LOWER COURTS' RESPONSIBILITY TO HIGHER COURT DIRECTIONS ON REMAND
Rich literature exists on the issue of the discretion available to lower courts in handling cases returned to them on remand from higher courts. 150 Similarly, many of these scholarly writings specifically address the responsibilities of lower courts when cases are remanded for reconsideration in light of changes in the governing law. 151 However, important to this Article is the state courts' handling on remand of a federally imposed constitutional analysis, which involves the realm of traditional federalism sensitivities. When the Supreme Court grants certiorari to a state case, this often initiates the Court's Grant, Vacate, and Remand (GVR) process-certiorari is granted, the lower court decision is vacated, and the case is remanded to the state court for further proceedings as directed by the Court. 152 Supremacy concerns are periodically raised as to whether the state court, on remand, followed the Supreme Court's instructions. 153 Remands from appellate courts for further proceedings below do not usually pose problems within state judicial systems or within the federal courts. Through their supervision powers, state supreme courts have the inherent capacity for dealing directly with non-responsive lower courts. 154 The same holds true of higher federal courts and remands to lower federal courts. Remands within the federal system where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship appear to cause few problems for state law development because state courts are not bound by the federal courts' decisions as precedent. 155 It is only the special case of challenged state supreme court decisions to which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, issued a ruling, and remanded the case back to the state court for further proceedings that raises concerns about the state courts' response to federal constitutional law dictates. 156 Scholarship devoted to this issue appears in periodic clusters in response to particularly vexing supremacy issues. For example, one of the most sustained flurries is found in response to Brown v. Board of Education and focuses on the Supreme Court's "with all deliberate speed" 157 order. 158 Other clusters can be found in response to decisions regarding certain civil rights issues, 159 death penalty remands, 160 sentencing guidelines, 161 and, recently, punitive damages awards. 162 In Campbell, the Utah Supreme Court provided some insight as to how to interpret a remand from the Supreme Court. 163 Justice Kennedy, writing the majority opinion, opined that the "facts of this case . . . likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of the compensatory damages." 164 On remand, State Farm argued that this language strictly mandated the Utah Supreme Court to reduce the punitive damages award to an amount equal to the compensatory damages. 165 After acknowledging its responsibility as an inferior court to honor the Supreme Court's decisions with utmost fidelity, the Utah Supreme Court expressed skepticism that its duties could "be reduced to an enumerated task list imposed by a 'mandate rule.'" 166 The Utah Supreme Court explained that, if the federal court had chosen to fix the maximum size of the punitive damages award, the state court would have no choice but to order the reduction pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling. 167 As read by the Utah Supreme Court, the Campbell opinion imposed no such mandate. 168 Instead, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned that the Supreme Court was following its customary practice and entrusted the state court to calculate the precise punitive damages award that met both the legitimate objectives of the state and due process demands.
169
The Utah Supreme Court believed that, upon remand, the Supreme Court intended to vest in the state courts the discretion to determine reasonable and proportionate punitive damages awards. 170 Applying the three guideposts and expressly disagreeing with Justice Kennedy's opinion on several key points, including the appropriateness of a one-to-one ratio, the Utah Supreme Court settled on a punitive damages award of over $9 million-greater than nine times the compensatory damages.
171
A similar issue arose upon remand to the Alabama Supreme Court in Gore, in which the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that it was compelled to limit the punitive damages award to a ratio of less than four times the compensatory damages. 172 The Alabama Supreme Court ignored Justice Stevens' suggestion that a four-to-one ratio was most appropriate and decided on a final punitive damages award of $50,000-twelve and one half times the $4,000 compensatory damages award.
173
It is beyond the scope of this Article to summarize the literature on this issue, but two themes commonly appear that are worth emphasizing. First, in characterizing the behavior of lower courts on remand, as illustrated in Campbell, much depends on the explicitness of the orders or the precision of the instructions handed down by the higher court. 174 Second, in the absence of specific orders or precise instructions, a well-developed jurisprudence on punitive damages awards has simply not emerged to guide lower courts handling cases on remand. Scholars remark that the law in this area is "fluid" and lacks guiding "neutral principles." 175 The few studies available on this issue suggest a low incidence of lower courts scrupulously fulfilling the decisional expectations of remanding courts. 176 This study of recent punitive damages decisions provides new insights into the lowers courts' fealty to what may or may not be perceived by them as "marching orders" issued by higher courts.
The "remittitur" is a procedural option not available in all jurisdictions.
177
Remittiturs strongly influence the rate at which disputed cases are remanded. 178 In jurisdictions where remittiturs are customary, a reviewing court may adjust punitive damages awards deemed unconstitutionally excessive and offer the plaintiff the opportunity to accept a reduced award by remitting damages above that level, or face a new trial on remand. 179 Most plaintiffs choose to accept the reduced award, thereby ending the litigation. Issues concerning whether or not a lower court has properly performed its duties on remand mostly arise in jurisdictions where remittitur is unavailable.
IV. THE STUDY AND ITS METHODOLOGY
In order to see whether the Justices' concerns in Williams III were valid regarding the lower court's faithfulness to the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence, this Article examines the reported punitive damages cases decided by lower state and federal courts since the 2003 Campbell decision. 180 The over 500 collected opinions were classified by the type of plaintiff's claim, which varied greatly from the type of economic harm at the center of Gore and Campbell. The cases were classified into twelve different types of claims based on the criterion that at least ten cases involving the specific type of claim were required to justify a separate category.
181
A substantial number of cases did not meet the ten-case criterion and were designated as "Other Cases." The wide variety in the types of punitive damages claims that fell into the "Other Cases" category accounted for nearly ten percent of the cases reviewed.
182 Surprisingly, there were only a small handful of class action cases.
Each case was analyzed in view of the type of claim presented, the implementation of each of the three guideposts, and the final outcome of the case. Variations in the application of the guideposts were identified with particular attention given to the relationship between the compensatory damages and the punitive damages awarded. The cases were tracked through several stages of appeals with attention given to the outcome and rationale at each stage of the process.
The analysis examined how the guideposts were implemented by each court and noted difficulties experienced by courts in applying each of the relevant guideposts to the broad range of punitive damages claims in the study. Statements by a lower court suggesting resistance to the guideposts were specially noted. Resistance or hostility to applying the guideposts was found to be rare; statements of frustration with the guideposts or signs of grudging acceptance of the Supreme Court's directions were also collected. This study yielded a broad idea of how the new constitutional punitive damages regime was implemented by lower courts, particularly noting signs of a lack of faithfulness or reluctance to implement the due process guideposts. 181. The twelve claim types developed were: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) employment; (3) fraud; (4) creditor abuse; (5) business torts; (6) insurance; (7) wrongful death and personal injury; (8) privacy invasion; (9) product liability; (10) property damage; (11) civil rights violations, other than Title VII; and (12) Title VII violations. See infra Appendix A.
182. Examples of punitive claims included in "Other Cases" were trespass to private property, securities fraud, aggravated assault and battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. See generally infra Appendix A.
183. The review also looked beyond the "faithfulness" question to other problems that presented themselves in the lower courts' implementation of the guideposts, including difficulties the lower courts were experiencing in performing their new responsibilities, specific issues for which the guideposts were not working well, and where further refinement of the guideposts by the Supreme Court or legislation could be beneficial. The results of this analysis are forthcoming in a more comprehensive article. [Vol. 62:371
A. General Observations: Searching for Lack of Faithfulness
The study revealed that the type of modern cases awarding punitive damages were much more varied than the two original cases yielding the guidepost analysis. Consequently, the study required close scrutiny to determine whether the "faithfulness" concern manifested itself in particular categories of cases. The cases in which courts expressed any negative feelings toward the new punitive damages jurisprudence were so rare that no discernible trend could be identified with respect to specific types of cases.
The study also revealed a trend that most state courts treated the new constitutional jurisprudence as supplemental to, and not a replacement for, their existing state law governing punitive damages. 184 For example, if state law had developed its own multi-part test for determining the appropriateness of punitive damages in a particular case, as most states had, later state court opinions simply adjusted these existing standards to include the three Supreme Court guideposts, or they applied the guideposts as a second level of review.
185
A significant number of cases involving punitive damages were brought in federal courts by plaintiffs who invoked the court's diversity jurisdiction. The federal court decisions based on diversity appeared to discover and apply the relevant state law on punitive damages, while carefully enforcing the evolving constitutional jurisprudence.
186
B. Overall Trends Show that Lower Courts Follow the Supreme Court's "Marching Orders"
To the extent that general trends could be observed over the ten years of cases studied, most noticeable was that, as a body of local law developed, state or federal courts within the jurisdiction applying the guideposts increasingly referred to precedents established by earlier decisions, particularly in the application of the third guidepost.
Based on the strong concerns expressed by several Supreme Court Justices in oral argument during Williams III, 187 one might expect, in a study of over 500 lower court opinions, to find considerable evidence of resistance or reluctance to carry out the new constitutional "marching orders." Instead, the study found that the lower courts almost always invoked the new constitutional doctrine correctly and dutifully proceeded to analyze the reasonableness and size of the punitive damages award before them by applying the three guideposts. some aspect of the Supreme Court's analysis, 189 -the strongest negativity found in ten years of lower court opinions arose because of growing dissatisfaction with Guidepost 3. Many courts noted the absence of a relevant civil fine or other penalty for similar misconduct to use as a reference point for the size of the punitive damages award being reviewed. 190 A number of courts questioned whether possible criminal sentences or administrative sanctions are even relevant to the comparability analysis, 191 and others simply skipped or substantially downplayed Guidepost 3 in their due process analysis. 192 Increasingly, lower courts appear to be converting Guidepost 3 into a search for comparable litigation results in punitive damages cases in their own jurisdiction. 193 Some courts looked for decisions applying Guidepost 3 in other jurisdictions that were relevant to the "fair notice" origins of this substantive-due-process based review. 194 The 
V. RECONCILING FAITHFULNESS FINDINGS WITH THE JUSTICES' CONCERNS
Finding almost universal faithfulness on the part of lower courts in accepting and applying the guideposts raises an interesting question: Given the seriousness of the concerns expressed by three justices in the Williams III oral arguments, 203 why did the lower courts not express more reluctance to engage in this additional layer of federally mandated judicial review?
One possible answer lies in the very limited nature of the issue under review in Williams III, which elicited the concerns in the first place. 204 Unlike other punitive damages cases to reach the Supreme Court, the case involved the narrowest of issues-the questionable phrasing of a single jury instruction. 205 Even Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Williams II was somewhat unclear as to whether the issue was a procedural irregularity or an error of substantive law. 206 If the challenged instruction misstated the controlling constitutional law concerning how juries are to calculate punitive damages awards, it would conventionally require a substantive due process analysis. Justice Breyer, however, characterized the problem as procedural. 207 If the mistake was substantive, and Oregon subsequently acknowledged a correct understanding of the applicable constitutional law, as it did in subsequent cases, 208 then this flurry of concerns about lower court fidelity to Supreme Court precedent was much ado about nothing.
Conversely, if the error was strictly procedural and Oregon may constitutionally prescribe the method by which a defendant may preserve this type of objection to a jury instruction for appellate review, then the Oregon decision denying Philip Morris the opportunity for further review of the issue was legitimate in light of the Supreme Court's deference to the states on such litigation decisions. 209 If so, then perhaps the Justices' reaction-interjecting themselves so memorably during oral arguments to express concerns about the Oregon court's ruling, possibly encouraging noncompliance by other lower courts-was perhaps an exaggerated reaction in the heat of the moment and later regretted. 210 Under either interpretation, the apparent conflict between the Oregon Supreme Court's insistence on following its own procedural rules and the Supreme Court's concern that its earlier ruling was not being followed appears to lack a viable predicate.
The most likely explanation, however, is that the inference of possible widespread unfaithfulness drawn from the Justices' expressions of concern in the Williams III oral arguments 211 was nothing more than over-the-top speculation without solid information about what was actually happening in the great majority of lower courts. Punitive damages cases reach the U.S. Supreme Court very infrequently, and it is even rarer that the Court finds a constitutional error and remands to the state courts for corrective action. 212 The dynamic of a state supreme court reacting to a remand from the Supreme Court to reapply the guideposts is quite different from the ordinary review of punitive damages awards in light of the guideposts within state or lower federal court systems.
With the benefit of hindsight, projecting a "faithfulness" problem from the Oregon Supreme Court's reaction to the remand in Williams II 213 was probably unjustified, and the study confirms this conclusion.
Interestingly, in nearly every opinion that the Supreme Court has issued involving this new substantive due process analysis to detect excessive punitive damages awards, the Court has made a point of acknowledging that, under well-established principles of federalism within the broad constitutional boundaries laid out in Gore 214 and Campbell, 215 it is the state's primary responsibility to make the ultimate decision regarding the best way to protect the state's interest through the awarding of punitive damages to produce retribution and deterrence of wrongful conduct. Thus, the constitutional doctrine that underlies these interactions between the Supreme Court and state supreme courts contemplates granting a great deal of independence and discretion to the state courts in determining the need for punitive damages and fixing the appropriate size of the award in a particular case. This federalism dynamic is less prevalent in higher state courts that review lower state courts' punitive damages awards, or federal courts of appeal reviewing district courts' diversity actions for punitive damages awards, thereby further diminishing the likelihood of "unfaithfulness."
Another possible answer to the absence of support for the "unfaithfulness" hypothesis in the lower court decisions lies in the ready availability of the remittitur device in most jurisdictions. When the reviewing court has the option of offering the winning defendant a remitter of the excessive punitive damages award or a new trial, there are fewer remands to the lower courts, and, therefore, fewer occasions for the court to whom the remand is addressed to disagree with the remanding court or complain about reapplying the guideposts as directed by the superior court.
VI. CONCLUSION
However its near total absence is explained, the "unfaithfulness" concern raised in the oral arguments in Williams III simply cannot be substantiated as a significant factor in the over 500 punitive damages cases studied. To the contrary, except in the handful of high profile Supreme Court cases in which inconsistency can be clearly observed between the Supreme Court's "marching orders" in the remand and the state court's subsequent disposition of the case, there is virtually no evidence of a lack of fidelity by lower courts to the constitutional guideposts governing review of punitive damages awards. Further, beyond widespread frustration with Guidepost 3, there are almost no signs of resistance or reluctance to applying the guideposts as promulgated by the Supreme Court. 216 Lower state and federal courts appear to be making conscientious efforts to honor the guideposts, interpret them reasonably, and apply them in the spirit in which they were promulgated. It is certainly true, however, that not all lower courts are consistent in the way they interpret and apply the guideposts, but the differences are not based on resistance to the obligation to carry out their constitutional duties. 217 Rather, lower courts reach different results in similar cases after carefully parsing the holdings and dicta found in the key Supreme Court opinions to find respectable rationales for decision, based on the peculiar facts of a case. This remains consistent with the Supreme Court's expectations and is readily observable across the full spectrum of judicial decisions at both the state and federal levels. 218 This is not to deny that there exist a number of perplexing problems that bubble to the surface when lower courts attempt to apply the guideposts in the manner they think the Supreme Court expects. These are the issues that will form the core of the second phase of this research project in which the same ten years of cases will be analyzed to determine how well the guideposts are working in practice to achieve the purposes for which the Supreme Court created them. To the extent certain aspects of the guideposts appear to be causing lower courts problems, analysis will be applied to offer suggestions about how the guideposts might be improved to make them more effective tools for correcting excessiveness in punitive damages awards. This larger and more important project will be reported in a forthcoming article co-authored with Professor Laura J. Hines of the University of Kansas School of Law. 217 . Cf. supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. 218. See supra Part IV; see also generally infra Appendix A (providing a list of the cases reviewed, categorized by type of claim).
